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THE ORGANIZATION OF SCIENCE FOR WAR: 
THE MANAGEMENT OF CANADIAN RADAR DEVELOPMENT, 1939-45* 
Davi d Zimmerman * * 
(Received 30 November 1985. Revised/Accepted 6 November 1986) 
The effective utilization of advanced science by the Western 
Allies during the Second World War was an important factor 
in the defeat of the Axis Powers. It has been recognized 
that Allied success in adapting scientific knowledge to 
military requirements was more the result of management 
and organizational techniques than of any technological super-
iority. While both British and American wartime scienti-
fic organization has been examined, there has been little 
or no work done on the Canadian scientific management struc-
ture. 
The radar programme was in size and scope the most important 
of Canada's scientific contributions. The institutional 
development necessary to manage the increasing team of 
scientists, engineers, politicians, soldiers, workers and 
businessmen set trends that governed all other scientific 
endeavours. An examination of the evolution of the radar 
programme's management structure shows the increasing impor-
tance of the civilian of the civilian scientist in the mili-
tary and the services' reaction to it. It also forces the 
re-evaluation of the role of individuals such as C.J. 
Mackenzie, and of institutions like the National Research 
Council of Canada (NRC), the Department of Munitions and 
Supply and the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Most significantly, 
this study also points to the need for a major revision of 
the current interpretation of the success of Canada's scien-
tific war. Historians have tended to be non-critical with 
their pra.ise, and part of their difficulty has been the 
failure bo recognize the bureaucratic structures that were 
created to administer the radar programme. As we shall 
see, this provides vital insights into understanding the 
root causes of the difficulties in research, development and 
production of radar within Canada.^ 
The origins of the radar programme can be traced no further 
than March 19 39 when Great Britain asked the Dominions to 
each send a physicist to learn of the top secret device's 
existence. The Department of National Defence (DND) did 
not have a physicist nor much else in the way of technical 
staff. All three services had been crippled by extremely 
* An earlier version was read to the 4th Kingston Conference, 
Queen's University, October 1985. 
** Institute for History and Philosophy of Science and 
Technology, University of Toronto, Toronto M5S 1K7. 
94 
small budgets and relied almost completely on the British 
for their technical and scientific requirements. What 
little military research that had been undertaken within 
Canada was done under contract with the National Research 
Council, the government civilian research centre ,and it was 
to this institution that DND turned to enable it to share 
British knowledge.2 
By 1939 DND-NRC relations were extremely close. The exten-
sive cooperation between the RCAF and the council's aero-
nautical laboratories and the creation of military/NRC 
advisory panels are the best examples. The strongest bond 
between DND and NRC was through the President of the latter, 
Major-General A.G.L. McNaughton, who had been Army Chief 
of Staff just prior to assuming his duties in June 1935.3 
While this close Council-De fen ce Department relationship was 
undoubtedly the primary reason NRC was chosen, another fac-
tor was that it was also the only scientific institution in 
the country familiar with military security procedures. The 
British had stressed to DND the need to preserve secrecy. 
Since 19 38 NRC physicists of the Radio Branch had been 
engaged in classified research on Cathode Ray Direction 
Finding (CRDF), a radio navigation aid. ^  
McNaughton sent to Great Britain the head of the Radio 
Branch, Dr John T. Henderson. It was a good choice, for 
Henderson was probably the best qualified Canadian for the 
mission. A research physicist, Henderson had extensive ex-
perience with the CRDF, a technological cousin of radar, 
and thus was familiar with the basic hardware and security 
procedures. Upon his arrival in April, Henderson, along with 
his RCAF assistant S/L F.V. Heakes, sent back a series of 
enthusiastic letters and reports outlining the fundamental 
principles of radar and its possible use in the defence of 
Canada. Henderson realized that the NRC would play a major 
role in the introduction of radar into the Canadian arsenal, 
a role made more important by blunt warnings that no British 
radar equipment would be available.^ 
McNaughton realized the gist of Henderson's messages better 
than did Henderson himself and saw the need to clearly define 
NRC-DND relations. For this purpose he met with the Chief 
of Air Staff, Air Vice-Marshall Croil, in July 1939. 
McNaughton later summarized his ideas on NRC-DND relations 
to Henderson: 
... the part which the National Research Council 
might usefully play in aid to the Department of 
National Defence was the organization and train-
ing of a small nucleus staff to the point that 
they could be available to the Defence Department 
to undertake research work required to fit the 
English proposal to Canadian conditions; that 
this staff would act as consultant to the 
Defence Department, undertaking research on 
problems as they developed. This staff could 
also assist the Defence Department in the 
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installation of the apparatus when received 
from England.^ 
Croil accepted the general's proposals and they were for-
malized in an NRC report of 2 5 July which became the basis 
of DND~NRC relations during the war.^ 
Despite these early organizational moves there was little 
progress in Canadian radar development before the spring 
of 1940. Prewar financial restrictions stymied early radar 
research. After an initial allocation of $18,600 in 
September 1939, no more funds were available until the 
following May. Only preliminary experimental work could be 
undertaken.8 
Perhaps the most important event of this early period was 
the appointment of C.J. Mackenzie to the post of acting NRC 
President. Formerly the Dean of Engineering at the 
University of Saskatchewan, Mackenzie came to the Council 
to replace McNaughton who rejoined the army to head the 
First Canadian Division. He was no stranger to the NRC, 
having been a member of the council and several advisory 
committees and had at least one friend in Cabinet, the 
future Minister of the Department of Munitions and Supply, 
fellow engineer C D . Howe. Building from the prewar power 
base left him by McNaughton, Mackenzie became the mandarin 
of wartime science, but he was not a fully competent admin-
istrator. He tended to concentrate his efforts on trans-
forming the council into a scientific centre of international 
standing rather than an effective military research and 
development laboratory — the two not necessarily being the 
same thing.^ 
The fall of France thrust Canada into the role of senior 
partner to a beleaguered Britain. Freed from prewar finan-
cial restrictions the radar program quickly took several 
vital steps forward. In July the first operational set, 
the Halifax Harbour defence set 'Night Watchman,' was completed 
and the first British-built equipment arrived at the NRC. 
By the end of the year more than sixty people were employed 
on radar work at the NRC. This exponential growth continued 
until the end of 1942 when more than 200 civilians worked 
on the project.1^ 
This growth was more than matched by the increased military 
demand caused by the expanding war effort and the greater 
utility of radar. All three services overtaxed the research 
facilities by making uncoordinated demands and by August 
1940 it was apparent that some formal procedures were needed 
to manage the programme. On 3 August the £rmy Chief of 
Staff, General Crerar, wrote to Mackenzie: 
... More should be done to coordinate the re-
quirements of the Navy, Army and Air Force in 
this regard and I have accordingly suggested to 
the Chief of the Naval Staff and the Chief of 
the Air Staff that a committee consisting of 
the representatives of the three services 
and the National Research Council, should be 
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formed for this purpose. iJ-
Crerar's proposal resulted in the establishment of a sub­committee of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, The Interservice Committee of Electrical Fire Control. It was organized as Crerar had suggested with representatives from each service, NRC and Research Enterprises Limited (REL), the crown cor­poration established to manufacture radar. At its first meeting on 16 November the chairman, F.V. Heakes, now a group captain, outlined the committee's mandate: 
... To ensure that each service was clear as to the others responsibilities, intentions and plans in using RDF equipment in order that overlap and duplication of effort should be elim­inated. 12 
The committee had no executive authority and only worked by consensus, something that was found difficult to obtain with the junior officers that were assigned to it. This organizational flaw became apparent in the spring of 1941 as the production component of the program began to come on stream. 
The decision to begin mass production of radar in Canada was not taken until July 1940. Considering the state of the Canadian electronics industry, it was a bold step indeed. There were few companies of any note and they tended 'to be manufacturing units only, dependent for their engineering and design on their American principals.'13 The task of establishing a radar manufacturer was seen as a matter of necessity in the summer of 1940. Unable to rely on British sources of supply or on still neutral America, Canada had to produce sets for its own and for Imperial needs.1* On 16 July representatives of the NRC, the three services and the new Department of Munitions and Supply met to determine how this manufacturing miracle was to be organized. W.C. Woodward, the department's representative, outlined a plan that was accepted as the basis of this new scheme: 
To preserve the secrecy of the equipment, the apparatus for any given application could be built as a number of separate units by different firms. The assembly of these units, together with the construction of such secret parts as aerials, should be done at a central plant under government super­vision. . .. 
... Mr. Woodward then remarked that he would recommend that a company be formed at once to operate under government supervision (simi­lar to C.I.L.) for the sole purpose of pro­ducing equipment not previously obtainable in Canada.1* 
In September Woodward's proposal was slightly modified and the responsibility for radar production was given to a new crown corporation, Research Enterprises Limited.16 
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REL was originally established in July to produce precision optical equipment and it seemed a logical step to add radar because of the high technology and top secret nature of both items. In the autumn of 1940, however, REL was still just an administrative superstructure but it had a Board of Directors and senior executives already in place who could quickly begin the planning for the new 'Radio1 factory. One of the original members of the board of the new company was Ontario industrialist W.E. Phillips, who from 30 November was the president. Phillips became a key player because of his determination to bring order to the management of the radar programme and his opposition to total NRC control. 
First priority was attached to the definition of the working relationship between REL and the NRC. In the first week of October, Professor E.F. Burton, a University of Toronto physicist and REL director, met with Henderson. They agreed that REL was to have control of manufacturing and the NRC of research, the two sharing responsibility for development. *-° Burton, however, secretly confided to REL1 s directors that the manufacturer should '... be in a position to foresee future trends and should recommend to NRC authorities lines along which REL thinks research should be directed.'19 Clearly Burton wished REL to be the senior partner in this relationship, a theme that would be echoed in the years ahead. 
REL began detailed planning for radar production in the spring of 1941 and found that the Fire Control Committee's lack of executive authority had resulted in a total breakdown in coordinated planning. The services 'were placing orders for practically the same equipment but with slightly dif­ferent specifications.'20 TO make matters worse, the ser­vices almost daily issued new specifications and made verbal commitments to orders that did not result in firm contracts. By April the REL was overwhelmed by these problems.21 On 19 April Phillips met with C D . Howe's assistant, E.P. Taylor, to express his concern over the confusion and was requested to submit a formal report. The REL staff took only four days to write their memorandum which called for the forma­tion of a new, more powerful committee to be controlled by one forceful civilian chairman: 
The question of sound organization in this field of electrical fire control is one of great importan œ and it has been apparent for some time that any lack of centralized direction in this field would inevitably lead to confusion. In a sense the position we have established for ourselves brings home to all the conflicting issue which must be solved be^ o-te we can piodu.ee. .... 
It seems that the reason for the present situ­ation, which in our view will increase rather than diminish confusion, is to be found in the failure of the Interservice Committee on Fire 
Control to function zhhzctivzlij in the, executive 4erc<6e. The tendency of the three services as represented in this Committee has been to 
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accentuate their differences rather than recon-
cile them.... 
... A chairman of considerable outside exper-
ience , even though he have no connection whatever 
with the Services, would substantially increase 
the effectiveness of this Committee and that it 
would then, with sufficiently wide membership, 
be the exclusive co-ordinating authority.... 22 
In his covering letter Phillips nominated O.M. Biggar, 
another REL director, for the new position.23 
Taylor passed the company's complaints on to Howe, perhaps 
the most powerful member of Mackenzie King's war Cabinet and 
the minister who had direct responsibility for the high 
technology crown corporation. On 29 April he wrote to 
J.L. Ralston, the Minister of National Defence, expressing 
his strong support for both REL's recommendations and 
Phillips' nomination.2^ Ralston consulted with his colleagues 
in the air and naval services and they ordered the Chiefs 
of Staff committee to reform the subcommittee on radar along 
the lines suggested by REL. Ralston, however, proposed 
that C.J. Mackenzie be given the chairmanship. Mackenzie 
and Howe had been friends since before the First World War, 
and the service chiefs were probably much more comfortable 
with a man with whom they already had extensive contact. 
The only people unhappy with the choice were those at 
REL.25 
The Chiefs of Staff approved a restructured Fire Control 
Committee, to be known as the RDF26 Committee, and Mackenzie's 
appointment on 6 May. Each service, REL and the NRC, was 
to appoint one senior-level administrative officer to com-
plete the committee's composition. Its powers were also 
outlined: 
Co-ordination of development, design require-
ment and production of RDF apparatus for the 
fighting services. This to include the deter-
mination of types, quantities and future require-
ments, and the preparation of all necessary 
production specifications.2 7 
Both the committee and, 'in case of fundamental differences 
of opinion,* the chairmen were empowered to consult directly 
with the Chiefs of Staff.28 
Mackenzie was determined from the outset to bring order to 
the radar programme. .Abandoning the failed ad hoc methods 
of the Fire Control Committee, he used his executive author-
ity to ensure that there would be no duplication or con-
tradictions. He was backed to the utmost by the Chiefs of 
Staff who came to rely on and trust Mackenzie completely 
and would support him against all opposition bo his author-
ity. 29 
Colonel F.C. Wallace was appointed the committee's secre-
tary. A British army officer and industrialist, he had 
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arrived in North America in the summer of 194 0 as a member 
of the Tizard mission. Staying on to assist and observe 
the Canadian scientific and industrial mobilization, he 
displayed a talent for organization and management along 
with a firm technical understanding of radar. In the spring 
of 1941 Wallace joined the Radio Section to assist Henderson 
who had proved to be a less-than-adequate administrator.3^ 
At the committee's first meeting, held at the NRC on 4 June, 
steps were taken to ensure that it would be the centrepiece 
of the management structure (See Figure 1). It was ordered 
that 'no specifications or alterations would be sent direct' 
to REL or the NRC but must instead be first approved by the 
committee. On 16 June, at the second meeting, the secre-
tary was made the central coordinator of all specifications. 
At the same meeting each service added a junior-level radar 
officer to assist with the technical requirements.31 
While in these first few meetings Mackenzie's committee 
brought a semblance of order to the radar programme, certain 
problems proved extremely difficult to cure. One concerned 
the poor management within the NRCs Branch Section which 
was not settled until January 1942 when Henderson was 
replaced by Wallace.32 This purely internal NRC affair was 
an easy matter compared to the problems between NRC s Radio 
Branch and the staff of Research Enterprises, which could 
not find the correct balance between quantity and quality 
or deliver sets on schedule. According to W.E.K. Middleton 
in his study of the Radio Branch, during 1942 both Mackenzie 
and Wallace became convinced that the source of the problem 
was the mismanagement of the huge new REL plant by 
R.A. Hackbusch, manager of the company's Radio Division.33 
Middleton cites as proof of the company's guilt the dramatic 
confrontation between Wallace and Hackbusch that occurred 
on 12 November 1942 in Phillips' office but fails to ade-
quately assess the reliability of the only surviving account 
of the incident which is found in Mackenzie's diary, a 
source that must be used with caution.34 
According to Mackenzie's account, Wallace began the meeting 
by accusing Hackbusch of allowing sets to leave the plant 
that were not inspected and that contained parts that did 
not meet specifications. Hackbusch denied the allegations 
and called in the plant's superintendent to document his 
case. Under cross examination by Wallace, however, the 
superintendent broke down and admitted that all of the 
charges were true.35 Relying on later diary entries, 
Middleton asserts that Phillips appeared to have lost con-
fidence in Hackbusch but refused to dismiss him. It took 
nearly another year for Mackenzie and Wallace to force 
Hackbusch to resign. Within a week Wallace was brought in 
as his replacement, while retaining his position at the 
NRC and in this unique double role was able to integrate 
research and production fully.36 
It is impossible, however, to accept this account at face 
value. While there were unquestionably serious problems at 
REL, the company's difficulties were compounded by NRC 
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Figure One: Canadian Radar Organization, July 1942 
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design failures and frequent requests by the services for alterations during the tooling-up phase of a project. The pre-production model of the RX/C radar, for instance, was delivered to REL by the Council in an incomplete state with­out, as the Radio Branch staff in charge of the project admitted, 'such matters as shock mountings, adequate cooling units, use of component parts to suit production specifi­cations, rigid rack construction, special wiring methods, etc. ...'37 From November 1942 to May 1943, the Navy request-more than a dozen design changes, many of them major, to the RX/C.38 
As Chairman of the RDF Committee, Mackenzie was responsible for finding a mutually-acceptable solution to the production problems, but he proved incapable of doing so because of the conflict of interest with his position at the NRC. As his diary indicates, Mackenzie refused to admit any council culpability and as a result the issue was allowed to fester until the spring of 1943 when Howe was asked by Ralston to resolve it. Raison1s letter of 2 8 April 1943 summarized a lengthy report on the radar manufacturer written by Mackenzie two weeks earlier which accused the company, among other things, of incompetence, deceit and giving Allied orders for radar higher priority than those of the Canadian services.39 
On 12 May Phillips and the REL staff responded angrily to Ralston's and Mackenzie's accusations. After comparing the company favourably with the radar manufacturers in the United States and the United Kingdom, Phillips launched into a vicious assault on the services and the NRCs tech­nical competence. He felt that the military 'quite uncon­sciously think of us as a special section of the Department [of National Defence], with the power to work miracles in production and to have at our command special facilities which enable us to produce complicated equipment without either prototypes or drawings and specifications.'40 
Typically, Howe sought a way to quickly diffuse the issue and assigned H.J. Carmichael, the Chairman of the Department of Munitions and Supply's Production Board, to investigate. Carmichael's report recommended that DMS establish a Radar Coordination Committee under the chairmanship of A. H. Zimmerman, the director of the Signals Production Branch with Wallace, Phillips and one representative from each service as members.41 This committee .acted as the pro­duction planning authority, although it gave certain powers to technical subcommittees, the most important being the Radar Components Committee established in March 1944.42 
By intentionally excluding Hackbusch or one of his staff from the membership of the new committee, Carmichael indi­cated that the REL radio manager's days at the company were numbered. It is still uncertain if Hackbusch was simply a scapegoat, sacrificed rather than the well-connected Phillips or Mackenzie, or the real villain; however, it is more than likely that all three men were to blame. What­ever the answer, the results were closer control of REL by the NRC and in September 194 3, Wallace took over the Radio 
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Division at REL while retaining his position at the Radio Branch. 
The formation of the Radar Co-ordination Committee did not seriously weaken Mackenzie's position because Zimmerman was directed to report to the Chiefs of Staff via the Radar Committee. Wallace, who was the NRC President's right-hand man on radar, sat on the committee, and it is possible that Mackenzie was not a member simply because he was already overwhelmed by the multitude of tasks he was already under­taking. Mackenzie's Radar Committee, while surrendering the direct control of REL to the Co-ordination Committee, continued to be the most important single management and planning body until its dissolution in November 1945 (see Figure 2). Ultimately the programme did produce creditable accomplishments, just one example being the development of the Type 268 radar, one of the most advanced centimetric sets in the Royal Navy during the last year of the war.43 These accomplishments, however, were greatly overshadowed by dramatic failures of entire elements of the programme. A major cause of these failures was the inability through­out the war to coordinate research and development with Canadian service requirements, the resolution of which was definitely within the mandate of Mackenzie's committee. 
The first detailed study of any of the service's experience 
with the Canadian radar programme clearly illustrates this 
problem.44 From mid-1941 to the end of the conflict, the 
Royal Canadian Navy's escort vessels suffered from a lack 
of adequate modern radar, and in large part this was the 
result of mismanagement of the technical and manufacturing 
elements of the programme. The most dramatic of the failures 
led certain officers to attempt to wrest control of the 
radar programme from the civilians. 
In the spring of 1944 the Royal Canadian Navy was forced to withdraw from service the brand-new ten-centimetre set, RX/C. It was found that the set, although sound in the laboratory, could not be maintained at sea.45 The failure convinced the senior naval radar officer, G.A. Worth, Director of Signals, there was a serious administrative problem which he blamed on NRC control of a naval project.46 Worth was determined to end the dominant role of the NRC in military science and to place Mackenzie's Committee under the control of the services' new technical staffs. On 8 April 1944, at the meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Joint Communications Subcommittee, Worth proposed that the Radar Committee be made a technical subcommittee of the JCC.47 Worth believed that now that the military had the ability to manage its own scientific programmes, no civilian should have control over operational and technical require­ments. He accused Mackenzie of gearing 'the progress of radar to NRC tempo when exactly the reverse of wartime re­quirements. '4^ 
Worth's attack was thwarted by the complete trust that the Chiefs of Staff had in Mackenzie. When considering Worth's argument, they simply referred the whole matter to the NRC 
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Figure 2: Canadian Radar Organization July 1944 
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president.49 Mackenzie rejected Worth's proposal and hinted that if the JCC were to gain control of the radar programme, the administration would collapse once again because of inter-service rivalries.5** Worth attempted four more times to supplant the Radar Committee but met with no greater suc­cess. The debate between Mackenzie and Worth became a heated one and, from June 1944, the latter forbade naval officers from attending committee meetings. The fact that Worth re­mained unsuccessful is an indication of the power and pres­tige of Mackenzie. 
The Radar Committee continued to operate until 19 November 1945 by which time the programme had been dramatically re­duced in scope.52 The NRC, as Mackenzie had planned since at least 1943, quickly abandoned military research and re­turned to peacetime pursuits with a greatly enlarged and improved physical plant and staff.5^ REL was sold to a variety of firms, including Corning Glass and Rogers Majestic Limited. Only a small radar assembly plant was maintained by the government under the auspices of Canadian Arsenals Limited, a new crown corporation established to provide 'a small peacetime munitions industry for research purposes and for supplying the Armed Forces.'54 Small-scale radar manufacturing continued at this plant until the early 1960s when production was terminated in favour of private industry.55 
The management structure that was developed for the radar programme gave the Council control of the largest single scientific project undertaken by Canada during the Second World War. Although there were several challenges to this power by REL and later by the Navy, Mackenzie and Wallace remained firmly in charge despite strong evidence of mis­management. How they were able to avoid a serious inquiry into the radar programme is still open to some doubt since an adequate study of work undertaken for either the Air Force or Army is yet to be done, but a recently completed examination of the Navy offers several possibilities. Mackenzie, as he was able to do in his dispute with Worth, raised fears of inter-service rivalries which gave him the support of the Chiefs of Staff. The NRC president's close friendship with CD. Howe cannot be ignored since the only serious examination of the programme was carried out by the senior staff of the Department of Munitions and Supply. Of course the council cannot be assessed all of the blame for there were serious problems within Research Enterprises and the services' technical staff. It was Mackenzie's responsibility, however, as Chairman of the Radar (RDF) Committee to rectify these difficulties, the fact that he was unable to do this cannot be ignored and calls for a significant re-evaluation of his performance as the mandarin of wartime science. 
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